War with Iran: A Decisive Choice or Psychological Warfare?

Vance’s recent interview with The Washington Post should be read from a broader and more analytical perspective. Rather than a clear declaration of intent, it reflects an effort to manage mounting uncertainties that have turned any potential military strike on Iran into one of the most ambiguous and high-risk choices in U.S. foreign policy today.

Despite Vance’s confident tone, the reality is that neither the timing, scope, form, nor potential endgame of military action against Iran is clearly defined in Washington. These unknowns have themselves become a strategic variable. His categorical assertion that there is “no scenario” in which limited military action would spiral into a prolonged Middle East war appears less a field-based assessment than a deliberate attempt to neutralize public perceptions of risk.

The vice president seeks to frame the military option as controlled, short-term, and low-cost—a portrayal sharply undermined by the historical experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. From this vantage point, the interview reads less as a prelude to war and more as an effort to restore the “credibility of threat” necessary for a brinkmanship strategy.

Simultaneously, a series of practical and media-driven measures reinforced this narrative. Reports of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford repositioning from the eastern Mediterranean toward Haifa, alongside accounts of partial force adjustments linked to the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, conveyed a singular message: readiness for potential military action. Regardless of their operational significance, these moves function primarily in the realm of perception management—signaling that the military option is not only “on the table,” but edging closer.

Yet this show of force stands in tension with domestic constraints. One of the most significant variables weakening the credibility of military threats is the growing effort within Congress to limit the president’s authority to initiate hostilities without explicit authorization. After two costly decades of conflict, a substantial bloc of lawmakers—particularly among Democrats—are reluctant to grant the White House broad discretion for another Middle Eastern engagement. Even if political will exists within the executive branch, the legal and political pathway is far from smooth.

Compounding the uncertainty is Iran’s fundamental difference from Iraq and Afghanistan. Tehran possesses significant domestic mobilization capacity under external threat, asymmetric military capabilities, an extensive regional network of partners, and strategic depth. Consequently, the warning issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—that even a limited U.S. strike could escalate into a regional war—cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric. It represents an operational reality and the very uncertainty Washington’s discourse attempts to minimize but cannot eliminate.

The timing of this rhetorical escalation is equally significant. It coincides with the third round of indirect U.S.–Iran talks in Geneva. Initial positive assessments by Oman, serving as mediator, and by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indicate that negotiations have moved beyond testing intentions and into a technical phase, with plans to continue discussions next week in Vienna. This development underscores that diplomacy remains alive and meaningful for both sides.

Washington thus confronts a structural contradiction. To extract concessions at the negotiating table, it requires a credible threat. Yet to avoid a costly and potentially uncontrollable conflict, it must refrain from acting on that threat. The result is simultaneous escalation in rhetoric and symbolic military gestures—without crossing the threshold into actual conflict. Vance’s interview, limited naval movements, and calibrated media messaging are components of this broader strategy.

What emerges from Washington’s posture is not the inevitability of war, but rather the absence of a fully viable operational scenario. The United States appears increasingly invested in maintaining the image of readiness, even as the real-world uncertainties of implementation risk destabilizing the broader regional balance.

For now, diplomacy remains the more plausible trajectory—albeit a diplomacy conducted under the shadow of brinkmanship, where threats are amplified yet deliberately ambiguous, and power is displayed more as leverage than as a prelude to war.